Impact of strengthening Intellectual Property Rights Regime on income inequality: An econometric analysis by Saini, Swati & Mehra, Meeta K
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Impact of strengthening Intellectual
Property Rights Regime on income
inequality: An econometric analysis
Swati Saini and Meeta K Mehra
centre for international trade and development ,jnu
2 February 2014
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/90220/
MPRA Paper No. 90220, posted 26 November 2018 14:31 UTC
 1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Following the TRIPs Agreement, a body of research has now emerged that focuses on the 
potential impact of TRIPs and IPRs on international technology transfer and diffusion, economic 
growth and welfare. Most of the theoretical literature that analyzes welfare implications of IPRs 
has come to the conclusion that North (developed countries) tends to benefit and South 
(developing countries) loses in terms of welfare due to more stringent IPR protection in the 
South (Helpman 1993; Lai 1997; Grossman and Lai 2005; Chu and Peng 2011). The channels of 
technology transfer and the ability of the South to take advantage of the technology to which it is 
exposed play a major role in ascertaining welfare implications of stronger IPRs. However, a 
major drawback of these studies is that, barring a few, most of them do not consider the 
distributional consequences of IPRs while evaluating the impact of IPRs on overall welfare. IPRs 
can affect income distribution of a country through a direct channel, for example, through wage 
distribution. Stronger patent rights can increase wage inequality by increasing the return to 
research and development (R&D) and the wage rates of R&D workers, who are mostly skilled 
labor (Cozzi and Galli 2009). More stringent IPRs can also raise income inequality indirectly via 
differences in income growth rates. For instance, Chu and Peng (2011) postulate that 
strengthening of IPRs spurs growth rates, which raises disparities in wealth distribution, leading 
to an increase in income inequality. A higher growth rate increases the real interest rates through 
the Euler equation. Higher real interest rates imply higher return on assets. This higher return on 
assets increases the income of the asset-wealthy households relative to the asset-poor households 
in each country. Zhang et al (2017), on the contrary, find that strengthening of IPRs in domestic 
country reduces income disparities in the presence of cross-country divergence in IPR protection 
and consequent, skilled mobility.  
            As far as empirical studies are concerned, there exist several that focus on the 
relationship between IPRs and economic growth (Gould and Gruben 1996; Thompson and 
Rushing 1996, 1999; Falvey, Foster and Greenaway 2006). Most of these studies indicate that a 
growth-enhancing effect of IPR protection depends on country characteristics. IPRs are 
positively and significantly related to economic growth in high-income and low-income 
countries but not in middle-income countries. However, to the best of our knowledge, there 
exists only one study that examines the relationship between IPRs and income inequality, which 
is by Adams (2008). Adams (2008) examines the relationship between IPRs and income 
inequality for a cross-section of 62 developing countries over a period of 17 years (1985-2001). 
He finds that strengthening of IPRs produces a significantly worsening effect on income 
inequality, implying that income inequality is raised.  
          As it is evident from above discussion, strengthening of IPRs has far-reaching effects on 
income distribution within a country. However, the distributional aspects of IPRs have not been 
studied in depth at all. There is a need to study this aspect of debate on IPRs and welfare more 
closely. Our study constitutes a small yet important step in this direction. We propose to extend 
Adams (2008) study in two specific ways. First, Adams (2008)‟s study analyzed the impact of 
more stringent IPRs on income inequality in developing countries alone for the period of 1985-
2001. During this period, TRIPs agreement had just about come into existence (on 1
st
 January, 
1995) under WTO, and developing countries had not begun to modify their domestic IPR 
regimes in compliance with the TRIPs agreement. We improve upon this by, firstly, taking the 
period of the study as 1980-2011, which corresponds to the time span when the developing 
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countries actually started the process of complying with the TRIPs requirement. This helps us to 
capture more effectively the impact of strengthening IPRs. Secondly, The TRIPs agreement 
requires WTO members to meet certain minimum standards within a stipulated period of time, 
therefore, the burden of harmonizing the IPR system across countries largely falls on the 
shoulders of developing member countries as TRIPs agreement specifies the minimum standards 
to be fulfilled based on those enforced in developed countries. Thus, there is a possibility that the 
effect of stronger IPRs on income distribution differs across countries depending on their level of 
development. An investigation of this possibility requires empirical substantiation that covers 
both developed and developing countries in the analysis.  Adams‟s (2008) study focuses on the 
relationship between IPRs and income inequality in developing countries alone. We include both 
developed and developing countries in the study, which allows us to bring out more starkly the 
differences in the income-distributions implications of stronger IP protection between the two 
groups of countries. Additionally, our study utilizes the most comprehensive income inequality 
data retrieved from the latest SWIID version 5.0 dataset. Also our study employs LSDVC and 
panel GMM estimation techniques which corrects for dynamic panel bias, unobserved 
heterogeneity, endogeneity and omitted variable bias. 
         The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and econometric 
methodology used in the paper. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis and Section 4 
concludes. 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
The data have been obtained from various sources. Most of the data are obtained from the World 
Development Indicators, World Bank. Our dataset is an unbalanced panel of 55 countries 
covering the time period 1980-2011.The sample of countries is diverse, representing different 
income groups and regions
1
. 
                   The Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) created by Fredrick 
Solt (Solt 2009) is the most comprehensive cross-national database of Gini indices across time. 
Taking Luxembourg Income study as standard, SWIID uses World Income Inequality Database 
(WIID 2.0) created by the World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United 
Nations University (UNU-WIDER), World Bank‟s PovcalNet and other databases to construct a 
cross-country panel of standardized Gini indices.
2
Instead of using a constant adjustment 
procedure to account for missing observations, Solt (2009, 2016) use various techniques to 
estimate the ratios between different types of Gini indices, focusing on information about the 
ratio in the same country nearby in time, to increase the number of comparable observations. 
Overall, the SWIID includes gross and net Gini estimates for income inequality for 174 countries 
from 1960 to 2013.Keeping in mind, the discussion above on construction and standardization of 
income inequality measures, our preferred measure for income distribution is the net income 
Gini index from Solt (2016).
3
 
                       To measure IPRs, we use the Ginarte and Park index, a widely used index for 
measuring strength of patent rights. It has been developed by Park and Ginarte (1997) and 
                                                            
1 The countries included in the sample are listed in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
2 http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fsolt/swiid/swiid.html .( Accessed  on 20 December, 2015) 
3 We tried using other inequality measures from WIID for sensitivity analysis but could not get sufficient 
comparable observations on income distribution for running our panel regressions. 
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extended by Park (2008). Initially, the index was constructed for 110 countries quinquennially 
from 1960 to 1990. But now, index has been extended to 122 countries and updated to 2010. 
Five categories of patent laws have been examined: (1) extent of coverage, (2) membership of 
international patent agreements, (3) provisions for loss of protection, (4) enforcement 
mechanisms, and (5) duration of protection. Each of these categories (per country, per time 
period) scores a value ranging from 0 to 1. These five categories of the index pertain to the 
aggregate economy as a whole. The unweighted sum of these five values constitutes the overall 
value of the patent rights index. The index, therefore, ranges in value from 0 to 5. Higher values 
of the index indicate stronger levels of protection.  
Besides IPRs, we include a number of other covariates in our specifications that may influence 
income inequality. Globalization is considered as one of the factors affecting income inequality 
(Milanovic 2005, Beer 1999, Sylwester 2005, Meschi and Vivarelli 2009). Following this strand 
of literature, we have included two indicators of openness in our model – net FDI inflows as 
percentage of GDP (FDI) and sum of exports and imports of goods and services as percentage of 
GDP (TRADE OPENNESS). 
               Education should also be taken into account while explaining within-country income 
inequality.  An increase in education implies an increase in the supply of skilled labor force, a 
decrease in the relative skilled/ unskilled wage differential and an overall decrease in income 
inequality (Meschi and Vivarelli 2009). Therefore, we have included SCHOOLING (defined as 
average years of secondary schooling of population aged 15 years and above) in our baseline 
model. The data for this variable has been taken from the Barro-Lee database.
4
 The baseline 
model also includes log of real per capita GDP to correct for any distributional effects driven by 
income levels. 
        Theoretically, it is argued that economies with good redistributive policies such as 
progressive taxes and social transfers are able to mitigate income inequality (see e.g. Rothstein 
1998, Aberg 1989)
5
. Therefore, following Dabla-Norris et al (2015), we include a proxy for 
redistributive policies which is a simple average of the three relevant sub-indexes (transfers and 
subsidies, public consumption and public investment) of the size-of-the-government index of 
Fraser Institute Index. 
  To examine the robustness of our results, we do sensitivity analysis by adding more covariates 
to our baseline specification. Good governance (institutions and policies that enforce property 
rights and restrain government corruption) are associated with lower income inequality (Knack 
and Anderson 1999).As proxies for institutional quality, we include two indicators of political 
rights and civil liberties from Freedom in the World report published by Freedom House. 
Countries are assigned scores from 1 to 7, with smaller values assigned to countries with greater 
liberties. Additionally, we incorporate a proxy for macroeconomic stability, Inflation Rate 
(measured using GDP deflator from WDI), in our empirical tests.
6
   
          Table 1.1 summarizes the variables used in our analysis. Table A.2 in Appendix provides 
descriptive statistics of the variables included in our empirical model. 
 
Table 1.1 Data definitions and sources 
                                                            
4 http://www.barrolee.com/ ( Accessed  on 22 January, 2016).Barro-Lee Dataset provides educational attainment 
data for 146 countries in 5-year intervals from 1950 to 2010 
5 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting about the role of redistributive policies. 
6 Inflation is measured as the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator.GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of 
GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency. (Source: WDI) 
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Variable Definition Source 
 NET INCOME GINI  Gini index on net income  SWIID 5.0  
 GROSS INCOME GINI  Gini index on gross income  SWIID 5.0  
IPRS  Ginarte and Park Index  Ginarte and Park(1997) and 
Park(2008)  
SCHOOLING Average years of secondary schooling  Barro and Lee(2013)  
PER CAPITA GDP  GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$)  World Development Indicators(WDI)  
TRADE OPENNESS Sum of exports and imports (% of GDP ) World Development Indicators(WDI)  
FDI  Net FDI inflows (% of GDP ) World Development Indicators(WDI)  
POLITICAL RIGHTS Political Rights Index  FREEDOM HOUSE  
CIVIL LIBERTIES Civil Liberties Index  FREEDOM HOUSE  
GOVT SPENDING Simple average of the three relevant sub-
indexes(transfers and subsidies, public 
consumption and public investment) of 
the size-of-the-government index 
Fraser Institute 
INFLATION GDP Deflator (Annual Growth rate %) World Development Indicators(WDI) 
 
 
 It will be useful to analyze a more detailed picture of income inequality for our sample of 
countries. Figure 1 reveals how average income inequality varies across different income 
groups
7
. The average income inequality is highest in upper-middle income countries followed by 
lower-middle income countries. High income countries have lowest income inequality. It seems 
that income inequality in low income countries have declined after 1990s. However, this trend 
should be studied with caution as we do not have a good representation of low income 
countries.
8
 
 
Figure 1. Income Inequality within Income Country Groups 
 
                                                                       
                                                                   Source: Solt Database 
 
                                                            
7 The income groups have been classified on the basis of World Bank country classifications at the end of 
the sample period. 
8 We have only Malawi and Sierra Leone from low income group in our sample of countries. 
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Figure 2 takes a closer look at the evolution of the average IPR scores for different income 
groups over time. While all the country groups (by income) exhibit a rise in their average index 
score over time, the high income countries followed by upper-middle income countries exhibit 
the largest magnitude of increase in their average index score. 
 
Figure 2 Average IPR protection by Income groups 
 
Source: Ginarte and Park (1999, 2005) 
 
2.2 Model Specification 
To analyze the effect of IPRs on income inequality, we formulate the following empirical model: 
 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 +  𝛽2 . 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 . 𝐼𝑃𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 .𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (1) 
 
where i represents each country and t represents each 5 year period. 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡  refers to 
income inequality measured by the net income Gini index for country 𝑖 in period 𝑡.The inclusion 
of lagged value of income inequality, 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡−1accounts for the persistent and path-
dependent nature of inequality which is affected by institutional and structural factors that are 
very slow to change. 𝐼𝑃𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 uses the Ginarte and Park IPRs index .We have used one-period 
lagged IPR index as it takes time for tighter IPRs to spur innovation and therefore, affect income 
distribution.  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡  include the additional covariates presented above. 𝜇𝑖   is idiosyncratic 
and time-invariant region-specific fixed effect while 𝜃𝑡  is time-specific heterogeneity. 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is a 
normally distributed error term. 
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                Since Ginarte and Park index for intellectual property rights and Barro-Lee education 
indicators are available quinquennially, the most common approach adopted in the existing 
empirical literature is to use data averaged over five-year periods to deal with this problem of 
missing data (Kanwar 2003). Data is averaged in order to remove short-term variation that may 
obscure the long-term effects, and since the variable of main interest – the Ginarte and Park 
index -- for IPR protection is only available quinquennially. We have also adopted the same 
approach. Our panel comprises of data averaged for seven 5-year time periods.
9
  
          However the inclusion of lagged value of income inequality leads to another problem of 
endogeneity. In this case, both OLS and FE estimation yield biased and inconsistent 
estimates.OLS estimation results in upward bias due to the positive correlation between lagged 
dependent variable and fixed effect whereas FE estimation results in downward bias due to 
negative correlation between within-transformed lagged dependent variable and within-
transformed error term (Nickell 1981).  
      The most widely used approach to cope with potential endogeneity problem in first-order 
dynamic panel specification is to use the two-step system Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation technique.
10
This estimator combines the first-differenced regression 
equations with the level equations in a single system. It, then, jointly estimates using first-
difference equations instrumented by lagged levels of regressors and using level equations 
instrumented by lagged differences of regressors (see Arellano and Bover, 1995, Baltagi, 2008).  
However, a weakness of GMM estimators is that their properties hold for N tending to infinity. 
Therefore, this method is only efficient asymptotically and can provide severely biased and 
imprecise estimates in panel data with a small number of cross-sectional units
11
. Since we have a 
small sample consisting of 55 cross-sectional units only, GMM designed for “small T, large N” 
may not be appropriate. Therefore, we have adopted an alternative approach of Least Squared 
Dummy Variables Corrected (LSDVC) estimation which is more suitable for small panels. This 
is a relatively new methodology proposed by Kiviet (1995), Judson and Owen (1999), Bun and 
Kiviet (2003) and extended to unbalanced panels by Bruno (2005). However, we have estimated 
Eq. (1) using two-step system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) methodology also and 
have presented the results of this alternative specification. 
           In the next section, we estimate equation (1) using the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), Fixed Effects (FE), LSDVC and GMM-SYS methodologies. The first method is affected 
by both heterogeneity and endogeneity; the second method takes countries‟ heterogeneity into 
account whereas both third and fourth methods take both heterogeneity and endogeneity into 
account. 
3. Empirical Analysis 
Columns (1)-(2) of Table 3.1 report the OLS and FE estimates of our model. With respect to our 
key variable of interest, we find that the variable IPR is negatively correlated with income 
inequality. However, as discussed above, OLS and FE regressions can provide inconsistent 
estimates owing to reasons such as endogeneity, dynamic panel bias and omitted variable bias. 
                                                            
9 Except for the last sub-period 2010-2011 which is a two-year sub-period. 
10 See Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) for details. In one-step system-GMM, the weighting 
matrix makes use of differenced errors, whereas in the two-step version, the one-step residuals are used to compute a 
new weighting matrix. 
11 We gratefully acknowledge an anonymous referee for pointing out this weakness of GMM estimators. 
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Therefore, we focus mainly on LSDVC results of Table 3.1. From Column (3), we find that 
negative association between IPR and income inequality as per OLS and FE results of Columns 
(1)-(2) is still statistically significant. This result is in stark contrast to the findings of Adams 
(2008). Strengthening of IPRs does not worsen the income distribution but instead reduces 
disparities. 
     However, the impact of tighter IPRs on income distribution of a country may depend on a 
country‟s ability to innovate. Generally, more developed countries have higher capacity to 
innovate than developing countries. To check whether the relationship between IPRs and income 
inequality is contingent upon the level of development of a country (or capacity to innovate), we 
include an interactive term for the IPR index and log of per capita GDP in other specifications in 
column (4) –(6) of  Table 3.1. As Column (4) reveals, the estimated coefficient on the interactive 
term is positively significant implying that the strengthening of IPRs raises income inequality 
more for countries at higher level of development. To test the robustness of our results, we 
introduce additional covariates – political rights, civil liberties and inflation rate to our baseline 
specification in Column (5) of Table 3.1. Inclusion of additional covariates does not alter the 
main finding of IPRs having a significant impact on income distribution which is conditional 
upon the level of development of a country.  
      The coefficient of IPRs is negatively significant in all the specifications, showing a value 
ranging from 0.9 to 0.75 (Column (1) – (6) of Table 3.1) which implies that strengthening of 
IPRs improves income distribution of a country. Zhang et al (2017) find a similar result, that is, 
strengthening of IPRs reduces income inequality in domestic country in the presence of cross-
border differences in IPRs and consequent mobility of skilled labour. However, the impact of 
tighter IPRs is also contingent upon ability to innovate which is captured by the positively 
significant interactive term. These two opposite effects reveal that there exists a threshold level 
of development (capacity to innovate) for IPRs to exacerbate income inequality.   
        Therefore, following Ford et al (2008) approach, we take the derivative of our econometric 
specification with respect to IPR and set it equal to zero to determine the threshold value of log 
of per capita GDP required to turn the total effect of IPR on income inequality positive. That is, 
 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽1 +  𝛽2 . 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 . 𝐼𝑃𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 . 𝐼𝑃𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
∗ log𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽5 .𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     
 
Differentiating w.r.t to IPR, we get: 
 
𝜕  𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸  𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝐼𝑃𝑅𝑆 𝑖𝑡−1
=  𝛽3 + 𝛽4 log𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 = 0 
 
This yields the following threshold level for log per capita GDP: 
 
log𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 =  
−𝛽3 
𝛽4
. 
 
As Column (1) – (6) of Table 3.1 reveal, the coefficient of IPRs (𝛽3) is negative implying that 
the threshold value of log of per capita GDP is positive. This threshold value of log per capita 
GDP is reported at the bottom of Table 1 for each regression. Figure 3 in the Appendix plots the 
value of log of per capita GDP over time for our sample of countries. Figure 3 reveals that the 
8 
 
log of per capita GDP for all the countries is above the range of threshold levels reported in 
Table 3.1.This implies that strengthening of IPRs worsens income distribution as the level of 
development (GDP) is greater than the range of threshold values calculated for our sample of 
countries.  Stronger patent rights increase wage inequality by increasing the return to R&D and 
the wages of R&D workers, who are generally employed as skilled labor (Cozzi and Galli 2009). 
Thus, strengthening of IPRs worsens income distribution in countries with higher level of 
development having higher ability to innovate. 
     Also it is clearly evident from Table 3.1, the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable are 
highly statistically significant implying that the estimates are affected by persistent and path-
dependent nature of income inequality. 
  
 
Table 3.1 IPRs and Income Inequality 
Dependent Variable                                                               Net Income Gini 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC LSDVC 
     Income Ginit-1      0.911*** 0.676*** 0.878*** 0.866*** 0.868*** 0.866*** 
 (0.023) (0.084) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
FDI -0.010 0.006 0.030 0.034 0.031 0.030 
 (0.060) (0.054) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) 
Trade Openness 0.000 0.006 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 
 (0.003) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
  Govt Expenditure 0.292*** 0.294* 0.257* 0.317** 0.317** 0.314** 
 (0.105) (0.170) (0.150) (0.150) (0.151) (0.153) 
Schooling 0.312* 0.315 0.284 0.251 0.199 0.203 
 (0.179) (0.325) (0.358) (0.363) (0.360) (0.360) 
Political Rights       0.226   0.229 
     (0.246) (0.248)  
Civil Liberties     -0.333 -0.341  
     (0.330) (0.333) 
Inflation     -0.000 0.000 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
Log GDP 0.080 1.590 1.689     
 (0.237) (1.058) (1.086)     
Log GDPt-1    3.473*** 3.500*** 3.509***  
    (1.088) (1.109) (1.174)  
(Log GDPt-1)
2
      0.509  
      (4.046)  
 IPRt-1 -0.489* -0.965*** -0.982*** -0.783*** -0.762** -0.757**  
 (0.279) (0.274) (0.270) (0.288) (0.297) (0.298)  
IPRt-1 *Log GDPt-1    2.658** 2.849** 2.647  
    (1.286) (1.292) (1.907)  
Constant 0.787 -2.899      
 (2.311) (11.038)      
Log GDP threshold - - - 0.295 0.267 0.285  
Observations 293 293 293 293 293 293  
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES  
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Number of 
countries 
55 55 55 55 55 55  
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the LSDVC estimate, the bias 
correction was initialised by the GMM-SYS estimator and bootstrapped standard errors were computed through 200 
iterations. 
   As for the control variables, we find that FDI is associated with higher income inequality 
(albeit not in a statistically significant way). Our variable for trade openness is found to be 
positively correlated with income inequality but is statistically insignificant. Trade openness can 
have mixed effects on income distribution depending on relative factor abundance and 
productivity differences across countries, and the extent to which individuals obtain income from 
wages or capital. Besides raising skill premium, it could also increase real wages by lowering 
(import) prices. At the same time, increased trade flows could lower income inequality in 
developing economies by increasing demand and wages for abundant lower-skilled workers 
(Dabla-Norris et al 2015).   
    The coefficient on government expenditure is statistically significant with magnitude ranging 
from 0.25 to 0.31 suggesting that an increase in government expenditure leads to an increase in 
income inequality. This finding is contrary to theory which states that economies with good 
redistributive policies are able to mitigate income inequality. However, as Anderson et al (2017) 
discuss, impact of government spending on income inequality depends on the extent to which 
social transfers are targeted on lower income groups. If social transfers are mostly captured by 
middle class, then the mitigating effect on income inequality is relatively small. Indirect transfers 
which constitute a major component of total government spending in developing countries 
relatively benefit higher income groups (Rhee et al 2014). Also, higher government spending 
does not necessarily imply higher social welfare. If the government is corrupt or predatory, then 
government expenditure might not enhance social welfare (Bergh and Nilsson 2010). 
        The impact of GDP per capita on income inequality is in line with theoretical expectation 
and is consistently positive across all specifications. This implies a 1% increase in GDP per 
capita increases income inequality by 0.035 points. However, we do not find evidence for 
curvilinear relationship between level of development and income inequality as the regression 
coefficient on squared term of GDP per capita is insignificant (Column 6).  
      Furthermore, our results suggest that Inflation which proxies for macroeconomic 
environment of a country has an insignificant role in raising income inequality. Bearing in mind 
that a positive sign in the corresponding coefficient of an explanatory variable indicates a 
worsening in the distribution of income we find that schooling appears to widen income 
disparities in a statistically insignificant way. The positive association between education and 
income inequality is in line with the findings of Carter (2007), Berggren (1999) and Bergh and 
Nilsson (2010). As Dabla-Norris et al (2015) point out the effect of increased educational 
attainment on income inequality can be positive or negative depending on other factors such as 
size of education investment by individuals and governments and the rate of return on education 
investments. Also, the coefficients on political rights and civil liberties are statistically 
insignificant.  
   As an additional test of robustness of our baseline findings, we replace net income gini 
coefficients with their gross income equivalents. Column (1) of Table 3.2 presents results when 
using gini coefficient of gross income as dependent variable. The variable IPRt-1 is no longer 
significant but the interactive term IPRt-1* Log GDPt-1  is still positively significant corroborating 
the baseline result that  the impact of tighter IPRs on income inequality is contingent upon level 
10 
 
of development of a country. Also, the magnitude of the coefficient of interactive term IPRt-1* 
Log GDPt-1   is greater when dependent variable is gross income gini coefficient implying that 
although strengthening of IPR worsens  income distribution but this impact is mitigated a bit by   
redistributive taxes and transfers of the government.  
         We, next, estimate our specification using an alternative estimator - system GMM  
developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
Table 3.2 IPRs and Income Inequality  
Dependent Variable Gross Income Gini Net Income Gini Gross Income Gini 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES LSDVC System GMM System GMM 
    
 Gross Income Ginit-1 0.804*** - 0.575*** 
 (0.061)  (0.130) 
Income Ginit-1 - 0.718*** - 
  (0.142)  
FDI 0.015 0.177 0.113 
 (0.053) (0.141) (0.169) 
Trade Openness 0.000 -0.009 -0.010 
 (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) 
Govt Expenditure -0.099 0.094 -0.477 
 (0.193) (0.394) (0.420) 
Schooling -0.195 0.568 -0.494 
 (0.466) (0.603) (0.571) 
Political Rights 0.442 0.360 0.761 
 (0.313) (0.497) (0.659) 
Civil Liberties -0.677 -0.557 -0.940 
 (0.420) (0.727) (0.956) 
Inflation 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log GDPt-1 5.540*** -1.594 -3.438 
 (1.459) (1.683) (2.335) 
IPRt-1 -0.070 -4.679* -9.957** 
 (0.383) (2.733) (4.707) 
IPRt-1 *Log GDPt-1 6.645*** 0.378 1.146** 
 (1.685) (0.321) (0.542) 
Constant  25.515 53.176** 
  (17.602) (23.659) 
Observations 293 293 293 
Number of count 55 55 55 
Time dummies YES YES YES 
Region dummies NO YES YES 
Hansen test (p-level) - 0.460 0.755 
AB test (p-level) - 0.324 0.762 
Number of instruments                   - 37 37 
Notes: The results reported for the Hansen test and AB test are the p-values 
of the null hypothesis of the appropriate set of instruments and no second-order 
correlation respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 We choose to treat IPR, FDI, trade openness, lagged Net Income Gini and log of per capita GDP 
as endogenous variables with lags up to 4
th 
period as instruments. FDI and trade inflows are 
influenced by level of development of a country. FDI can be endogenous to growth as a growing 
economy attracts additional FDI due to presence of higher profit opportunities. IPR can be 
endogenous to growth if country adopts stronger IPR protection due to lobbying by established 
domestic industries who have accumulated their own IP (Kashcheeva 2013). We treat Schooling, 
Political Rights and Civil Liberties as pre-determined variables because education and 
governance cannot have immediate effect on income distribution but they impact only with a 
time lag. Therefore, these variables can be correlated with error terms in later periods rather than 
in current period. As suggested by Roodman (2009a), we collapse the instrument set to reduce 
the number of moment conditions in order to avoid overfitting bias due to instrument 
proliferation. Also, since the estimated standard errors of the two step GMM estimates tend to be 
negatively biased, we eliminate the bias by using Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction by 
using two-step robust GMM (Windmeijer, 2005; Roodman, 2009b).  
     As Column (2) of Table II shows, the Arellano Bond (AB) test and Hansen test could not 
reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation and instrument validity. Also, Difference-in-
Hansen statistics (not reported) show that all groups of instruments for endogenous variables are 
exogenous. The GMM estimation indicates that the negative direct effect of IPRs on income 
distribution is still significant whereas the positive indirect effect captured by IPRt-1* Log GDPt-1 
loses its significance when net income gini is the dependent variable. However, the negative 
direct effect and positive indirect effect of IPRs remain significant when gross gini coefficients 
replace net gini coefficients as dependent variable (Column (3) of Table 3.2). 
     However, as discussed earlier, a weakness of GMM estimators is that their properties hold for 
N tending to infinity. Therefore, this method is only efficient asymptotically and can provide 
severely biased and imprecise estimates in panel data with a small number of cross-sectional 
units. This is the limitation of our dataset as we have data for a cross-section of 55 countries. 
Therefore, we put our utmost significance on our LSDVC results reported in Table 3.1. 
        
5. Conclusion 
Theoretical literature argues that IPRs tend to raise income inequality by generating a more 
skewed distribution of wages. The underlying notion is that stronger IPRs increase the demand 
for skilled labor force as it raises the return on R&D activities. This causes a relative increase in 
skilled labor wages, creating a wage bias in favor of skilled labor against unskilled labor, thus 
aggravating income inequality within a country. However, the impact of tighter IPRs on income 
distribution of a country may depend on a country‟s ability to innovate. Generally, more 
developed countries have higher capacity to innovate than developing countries. This paper 
empirically investigates the relation between IPRs and income distribution. This paper finds that 
there exists a negative correlation between IPRs and income inequality irrespective of level of 
development of a country whereas there exists a positive correlation between tighter IPRs and 
income distribution which is contingent upon a country‟s ability to innovate. These two opposite 
effects imply that there exists a threshold value for level of development beyond which 
strengthening of IPRs exacerbates income inequality. We find that strengthening of IPRs 
worsens income distribution for our sample of countries as the level of development (GDP) is 
greater than the range of threshold values calculated for our sample set.   
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A.1: Sample of Countries  
High Income Upper Middle Income Lower Middle Income Low Income 
Australia Brazil Bolivia Malawi 
Austria Bulgaria Egypt Sierra Leone 
Canada Chile El Salvador 
 Cyprus Colombia Guatemala 
 Denmark Costa Rica Honduras 
 Finland Dominican Republic India 
 France Ecuador Indonesia 
 Germany Jordan Pakistan 
 Greece Malaysia Paraguay 
 Hungary Mexico Philippines 
 Iceland Panama Sri Lanka 
 Ireland Peru   
 Italy South Africa 
  Japan Thailand 
  South Korea Tunisia 
  Netherlands Turkey   
 New Zealand Uruguay 
  Poland Venezuela   
 Portugal 
   Singapore 
 
  
 Spain 
   Sweden     
 United Kingdom 
   United States 
   
 
                                                 Table A.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Net Income Gini 349 37.83921 9.597657 19.683 60.4347 
Gross Income Gini 349 46.37631 6.7101 27.035 69.0846 
FDI 349 2.759806 3.460608 -4.30981 24.1068 
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Civil Liberties 349 2.58639 1.446436 1 6.8 
Inflation 349 29.82123 182.6599 -6.21548 2522.81 
Schooling 349 2.738711 1.281455 0.19 6.84 
IPR 349 2.977908 1.215421 0.2 4.88 
Trade Openness 349 73.45479 53.77766 13.04379 410.2466 
Per Capita GDP 349 14235.92 14657.9 192.782 59001.5 
Government Expenditure 349 6.363028 1.423436 2 9.74 
Political Rights 349 2.310888 1.564154 1 7 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Plot of log of per capita GDP over time for the sample of countries 
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